War in the Information Age

The following essay captures the relevance of these three works to the prolonged irregular war against the Taliban and al Qaeda. Based on the arguments so aptly put forth in these studies, this essay posits that irregular warfare in the twenty-first century requires intuitive and creative leaders who can masterfully weave information operations, combined general-purpose operations, and special operations to undermine irregular adversaries through fully complementary lethal and nonlethal actions. The four authors bring new insight to irregular warfare strategy in general, and to the ongoing war in particular. This irregular war is a protracted struggle, one that will see persistent conflict and presence in Afghanistan and other regions for decades. It remains, however, a war without a name. The US government has not yet exhibited a great deal of coherence or consistency in describing it. The " Global War on Terrorism, " " Long War, " " Persistent Conflict, " and " Overseas Contingency Operations " are not especially useful terms. Today's battle is an effort aimed at defeating a revolution that conflates insurgency and terrorism and reaches across regions. The enemy, comprising Taliban guerrillas, al Qaeda, and its franchises, pursues a strategy of exhaustion and erosion against the West. To use John B. Alexander's term, " World War X " is an irregular war unlimited in scope and is mainly a matter of matching ideas with actions to sustain the support of the relevant populations. The first work reviewed is Rid and Hecker's War 2.0. It is topical because it analyzes the effects of media and information on the current struggle to influence the perception of the populations within and across insurgencies. In the introduction, the authors correctly state that it can be difficult for an external military force to sustain a good public image while prosecuting combat operations among a population. The authors point out that irregular fighters often find it easier to appear successful in the information environment, simply by blowing up things. The counterinsurgents, on the other hand, face the far-more difficult task of building governments and institutions. Destruction has an immediate informational impact, whereas construction projects are slow to achieve effects. Successful counterinsurgency, in other words, " is much less attention-grabbing and much more resource-consuming than effective insurgency. " A corollary of irregular warfare in the information age is the advent of modern communications technology and the resurgence in insurgency. Together,