The Evolution of Negotiation and Impasse in Two-Party Multi-issue Bargaining

Automated negotiation systems are becoming increasingly important and pervasive. Most previous research on automated negotiation has focused on understanding and formalizing “successful” negotiations, i.e., negotiations that do not become contentious to the point of impasse. This paper shifts the emphasis to negotiations that are “difficult” to resolve and can hit an impasse. It analyses a situation where two agents bargain over the division of the surplus of several distinct issues to demonstrate how a procedure to avoid impasses can be utilized in a specific negotiation setting. The procedure is based on the addition of new issues to the agenda during the course of negotiation and the exploration of the differences in the valuation of these issues to capitalize on Pareto optimal agreements. This paper also lays the foundation for performing an experiment to investigate how the evolution of negotiation contributes to the avoidance of impasses, paying particular attention to the expansion of the number of issues to be deliberated and its impact on the frequency of impasses.