The Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma with Private Monitoring: a N-player case¤
نویسندگان
چکیده
This paper studies the repeated prisoners’ dilemma with private monitoring for arbitrary number of players. It is shown that a mixture of a grim trigger strategy and permanent defection can achieve an almost e¢cient outcome for some range of discount factors if private monitoring is almost perfect and symmetric, and if the number of players is large. This approximate e¢cieicny result also holds when the number of players is two for any prisoners’ dilemma as long as monitoring is almost perfect. A detailed characterization of these sequential equilibria is provided.
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