Existence of a pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium in imperfectly discriminating contests
نویسنده
چکیده
We consider a general class of imperfectly discriminating contests with privately informed players. We show that findings by Athey (2001) imply the existence of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in monotone pure strategies. JEL classification: D72, D74, D82, C72
منابع مشابه
A note on Bayesian Nash equilibria in imperfectly discriminating contests
The literature on imperfectly discriminating contests has almost exclusively focused on complete information. We study such contests assuming players have private information. We identify a general class of imperfectly discriminating contests for which findings by Athey (2001) imply the existence of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in monotone pure strategies. The main assumptions are that a player’...
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