Maximizing matching in double-sided auctions
نویسندگان
چکیده
Traditionally in double auctions, offers are cleared at the equilibrium price. In this paper, we introduce a novel, non-recursive, matching algorithm for double auctions, which aims to maximize the amount of commodities to be traded. Our algorithm has lower time and space complexities than existing algorithms.
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