Incomplete Information, Dynamic Stability and the Evolution of Preferences: Two Examples
نویسندگان
چکیده
We illustrate general techniques for assessing dynamic stability in games of incomplete information by re-analyzing two models of preference evolution, the Arce (2007) PrincipalAgent game and the Friedman and Singh (2009) Noisy Trust game. The techniques include extensions of replicator and gradient dynamics, and for both models they confirm local stability of the key static equilibria. That is, we obtain convergence in time average for initial conditions sufficiently near equilibrium values.
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عنوان ژورنال:
- Dynamic Games and Applications
دوره 4 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2014