Narratives, Imperatives and Moral Reasoning

This paper provides a theoretical framework to explain recent empirical findings on the malleability of morality, and suggest new testable implications. Building on a basic model with image concerns, we introduce the concept of narratives that allow individuals to maintain a positive image when in fact acting in a morally questionable way. We show how narratives, however feeble, inhibit moral behavior in downplaying externalities, magnifying the cost of moral behavior, or in suggesting not being pivotal. We further show that narratives spread virally when negative, but not when positive. We then turn to imperatives, i.e., moral rules or precepts, as a mode of communication to persuade agents to behave morally, and identify the conditions under which Kantian behavior will emerge in an otherwise fully utilitarian environment. We also show how an unwillingness to engage in trade-offs can arise, with implications for the elicitation of moral preferences. Finally, we study how collective decision making and organizational design produces a sub-additivity of responsibility.