Incentive-compatible Resource Allocation in Overlapping Heterogeneous Wireless Networks

This paper considers the coordinated radio resource allocation problem for users which are simultaneously covered by multiple overlapping heterogeneous wireless networks. As the resource allocation decision depends on the channel measurement and feedback from users, inefficiency and instability arise if a selfish user can manipulate its measured channel state to increase its gain from network. Our contribution in this paper is the introduction of incentive compatibility as an addition criterion in the design of a resource allocation scheme. We formulate the multi-cell resource allocation game to capture the strategic interactions among users. A resource allocation scheme is incentive compatible if each user’s dominant strategy under the resulted game is to honestly report its channel state. We consider both multi-association setting, where a MS is allowed to simultaneously associate with multiple BSs, and single-association setting, where a MS is only associated with one BS. We show that for multi-association setting, a natural generalization of proportional fair allocation is incentive compatible. In contrast, the optimal solution using the same fairness criterion under single-association is not incentive compatible. In order to exploit the benefit of single-association, we propose an allocation scheme based on selfish load balancing. We show that such a scheme always converges to a Nash equilibrium, and achieves performance close to the optimal single-association allocation.