Comments on purification in continuum games
نویسنده
چکیده
It is pointed out that Corollary 1 in a recent paper by Khan et al. (Int J Game Theory 34:91–104, 2006), presented there as an extension of the Dvoretzky– Wald–Wolfowitz theorem, is a special case of Lyapunov’s theorem for Young measures (Balder in Rend Instit Mat Univ Trieste 31 Suppl. 1:1–69) It is also pointed out that Theorems 1–4 in Khan et al. (Int J Game Theory 34:91–104, 2006) follow from a single strong purification per se result that is already contained, as an implementation of that Lyapunov theorem for Young measures, in the proof of Theorem 2.2.1 in Balder (J Econ Theory 102:437–470, 2002).
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عنوان ژورنال:
- Int. J. Game Theory
دوره 37 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2008