Transit Response to Congestion Pricing Opportunities: Policy and Practice in the U.S

This research assesses how U.S. transit agencies have taken advantage of congestion pricing projects and answers two questions: (1) what role has transit played in U.S. congestion pricing projects, and (2) how have transit agencies responded to congestion pricing projects through service planning, operating practices, capital investment, and institutional arrangements. First, transit is seen as a direct beneficiary of congestion pricing projects since transit systems operate free of charge, thereby achieving a more reliable and/or faster travel time, thereby as well as facilitating a shift to a higher occupancy mode (buses). Second, a micro-level analysis comparing two congestion pricing projects in Northern Virginia is made. Introduction Congestion pricing is designed to reduce traffic congestion by charging users a higher fee when roads are busier and a lower fee when they are not and is based upon fundamental economic principles of allowing market forces and pricing to allocate the use of finite transportation system capacity (Rouwendal and Verhoef 2006). The primary intent of congestion pricing is to mitigate the effect of too much demand on the roadway infrastructure and ensure efficient system utilization. Historically, two concerns of deploying congestion pricing projects in the Journal of Public Transportation, Vol. 12, No. 3, 2009 62 United States have been technical feasibility and political acceptability (Giuliano 1992). While technical feasibility has been addressed through the development of open-road tolling and other ITS technologies, political acceptability has not been fully addressed. Concerning political acceptability, in the commissioned paper Curbing Gridlock: Peak-Period Fees to Relive Congestion, Kain (1994) suggests that little political attention had been given to transit in the past because the effects are complex and require a number of assumptions that are difficult to defend. However, recent experience suggests two components concerning the political acceptability of congestion pricing projects related to transit. First, transit is seen as a direct beneficiary of congestion pricing projects since transit systems operate free of charge, thereby achieving a more reliable and/or faster travel time, thereby facilitating a shift to a higher occupancy mode (buses). For example, according to Small’s (2005) assessment of London’s congestion pricing system, “...better [transit] service was made possible, desirable, and financially viable by congestion pricing itself.” Second, transit addresses the concern of fairness (or social equity) regarding the use of publically-funded transportation infrastructure (Giuliano 1994). Concerns about social equity center around the effect that congestion pricing may have on lowerincome groups (Viegas 2001). Recently, an NCHRP study regarding the public opinion of congestion pricing projects articulates social equity as a key concern of the public as well as how revenue generated by the project is used (Zmud and Arce 2008). Weinstein and Sciara conclude that social equity has a tendency to shape the overall design of the project, which often includes spending the revenue generated on alternate transportation options for users (Weinstein and Sciara 2006). Thus, it would appear that including transit in the planning and design of congestion pricing projects appears to be essential to make it politically tenable. If congestion pricing projects require some type of transit involvement, the question becomes, with more than 15 years having passed since the U.S. implemented its first congestion pricing system in California, what role has transit really played? New initiatives by the U.S. Department of Transportation (U.S.DOT), including more than $1 billion to further demonstrate congestion pricing in the U.S., provide the opportunity to address this question more in-depth. Additionally, two congestion pricing projects using private equity being constructed in the Commonwealth of Virginia that will bring on-line nearly 150 lane-miles of congestion pricing by 2013 further add to the available data from which to draw. This paper addresses the following two research questions: