Anti-luck Epistemology, Pragmatic Encroachment, and True Belief

Two common theses in contemporary epistemology are that 'knowl-edge excludes luck' and that knowledge depends on 'purely epistemic' factors. In this essay, I shall argue as follows: given some plausible assumptions, 'anti-luck epistemology,' which is committed to the fi rst thesis, implies the falsity of the second thesis. That is, I will argue that anti-luck epistemology leads to what has been called 'pragmatic encroachment' on knowledge. Anti-luck epistemologists hoping to resist encroachment must accept a controversial thesis about true belief or a dubious claim about luck and value and interests. All of this should come as a surprise. Arguments for pragmatic encroachment usually highlight the relationship between knowledge and action, rather than highlight some (putative) feature of knowledge itself. The argument I'll offer links together work on three ordinarily unconnected topics within epistemology: anti-luck epistemology (e. In the end, the argument may lead theorists away from anti-luck epistemology and toward related approaches not concerned to eliminate luck. I shall suggest that 'luck-free' views may avoid the troubles that beset anti-luck epistemologies.