14 . 12 Game Theory Lecture Notes Lectures
نویسنده
چکیده
In these lectures, we analyze the issues arise in a dynamics context in the presence of incomplete information, such as how agents should interpret the actions the other parties take. We define perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium, and apply it in a sequential bargaining model with incomplete information. As in the games with complete information, now we will use a stronger notion of rationality – sequential rationality.
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تاریخ انتشار 2002