Cultural group selection , coevolutionary 3 processes and large - scale cooperation

8 In constructing improved models of human behavior, both experimental and behavioral econo9 mists have increasingly turned to evolutionary theory for insights into human psychology and 10 preferences. Unfortunately, the existing genetic evolutionary approaches can explain neither the 11 degree of prosociality (altruism and altruistic punishment) observed in humans, nor the patterns of 12 variation in these behaviors across different behavioral domains and social groups. Ongoing mis13 understandings about why certain models work, what they predict, and what the place is of “group 14 selection” in evolutionary theory have hampered the use of insights from biology and anthropology. 15 This paper clarifies some of these issues and proposes an approach to the evolution of prosociality 16 rooted in the interaction between cultural and genetic transmission. I explain how, in contrast to 17 non-cultural species, the details of our evolved cultural learning capacities (e.g., imitative abilities) 18 create the conditions for the cultural evolution of prosociality. By producing multiple behavioral 19 equilibria, including group-beneficial equilibria, cultural evolution endogenously generates a mech20 anism of equilibrium selection that can favor prosociality. Finally, in the novel social environments 21 left in the wake of these cultural evolutionary processes, natural selection is likely to favor prosocial 22 genes that would not be expected in a purely genetic approach. 23 © 2003 Published by Elsevier B.V. 24 JEL classification: D00; C72 25 26