TECHNICAL REPORTS Multi-Object Auctions with a Single Bundle Bidding for Perfect Complements
نویسندگان
چکیده
In this paper, we consider multi-object auctions in which each bidder submits a pair of a subset of objects and his purchase price for the set. The seller solves the assignment problem of objects to maximize his revenue, and decides the winning bidders who can purchase their reporting subset for the prices given. We analyze this auction on the assumption that each bidder has one special subset of objects which are perfect complements for him, and that no object out of the subset is valuable for him. We show that this auction leads to an eÆcient allocation through a Nash equilibrium, if it exists. We also show that when the bid-grid size is suÆciently small, the equilibrium exists. Journal of Economic Literature Classi cation Numbers: C72, D44, D51. The title of the previous version of this paper is \Multi-object Auctions with Necessary Bundles." We are grateful to Yukihiko Funaki, Atsushi Kajii, Shiro Matsuura, Naoko Nishimura, Shinji Ohseto, Tomoichi Shinotsuka, Yoshikatsu Tatamitani and Takehiko Yamato for helpful comments and discussions. Department of Mathematical Engineering and Information Physics, Graduate School of Engineering, University of Tokyo, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo , Japan. http://www.misojiro.t.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~tomomi/ Faculty of Economics, Tokyo Metropolitan University, Minami-Oosawa 1-1, Hachiouji, Tokyo, Japan. [email protected], http://ec219-01.econ.metro-u.ac.jp/watanabe
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