Bargaining power and local labour market in°uences on wage determination
نویسنده
چکیده
This paper uses a unique panel of data at the level of the bargaining group to examine aspects of `right-to-manage' models of wage determination. Empirical measures of ̄rms' and unions' bargaining power are identi ̄ed and found to be important in°uences on wage setting. The role of union characteristics in wage determination is examined; results con ̄rm their importance and illuminate previous survey ̄ndings. Features of the local labour market are shown to a®ect bargained wages over and above the in°uence of aggregate factors.
منابع مشابه
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