A mechanism for the evolution of altruism among nonkin: positive assortment through environmental feedback.

نویسندگان

  • John W Pepper
  • Barbara B Smuts
چکیده

The evolution of altruism often requires genetic similarity among interactors. For structured populations in which a social trait affects all group members, this entails positive assortment, meaning that cooperators and noncooperators tend to be segregated into different groups. Several authors have claimed that mechanisms other than common descent can produce positive assortment, but this claim has not been generally accepted. Here, we describe one such mechanism. The process of "environmental feedback" requires only that the cooperative trait affects the quality of the local environment and that individuals are more likely to leave low-quality than high-quality environments. We illustrate this dynamic using an agent-based spatial model of feeding restraint. Depending on parameter settings, results included both positive assortment (required for the evolution of altruism) and negative assortment (required for the evolution of spite). The mechanism of environmental feedback appears to be a general one that could play a role in the evolution of many forms of cooperation.

برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

ثبت نام

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

منابع مشابه

Simple Models of Assortment through Environmental Feedback

Social evolution depends critically on assortment, or segregation versus even mixing, between cooperators and noncooperators. Altruistic traits, which reduce the absolute fitness of their bearers, cannot evolve without positive assortment (excess segregation). The question of how positive assortment can arise has been controversial, but most evolutionary biologists believe that common descent i...

متن کامل

How altruism evolves: assortment and synergy.

If one defines altruism strictly at the population level such that carriers of the altruistic genotype are required to experience, on average, a net fitness cost relative to average population members, then altruism can never evolve. This is simply because a genetically encoded trait can only increase in a population (relative to alternative traits) if the mean fitness of individuals carrying t...

متن کامل

A simple and general explanation for the evolution of altruism.

We present a simple framework that highlights the most fundamental requirement for the evolution of altruism: assortment between individuals carrying the cooperative genotype and the helping behaviours of others with which these individuals interact. We partition the fitness effects on individuals into those due to self and those due to the 'interaction environment', and show that it is the lat...

متن کامل

The kin composition of social groups: trading group size for degree of altruism.

Why some social systems form groups composed of kin, while others do not, has gone largely untreated in the literature. Using an individual-based simulation model, we explore the demographic consequences of making kinship a criterion in group formation. We find that systems where social groups consist of one-generation breeding associations may face a serious trade-off between degree of altruis...

متن کامل

Strong altruism can evolve in randomly formed groups.

Although the conditions under which altruistic behaviors evolve continue to be vigorously debated, there is general agreement that altruistic traits involving an absolute cost to altruists (strong altruism) cannot evolve when populations are structured with randomly formed groups. This conclusion implies that the evolution of such traits depends upon special environmental conditions or addition...

متن کامل

ذخیره در منابع من


  با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید

برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

ثبت نام

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

عنوان ژورنال:
  • The American naturalist

دوره 160 2  شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 2002