Moral Hazard and Prices in Argentina’s Health Markets
نویسنده
چکیده
This paper empirically studies two issues in health insurance provision for wage and salary workers in Argentina and their utilization of health services: (1) the moral hazard problem; and (2) the role of prices in utilization. I examine the relationship between insurance and utilization both by estimating how insurance type affects utilization and by parameterizing characteristics of seven major Obras Sociales (social insurance organizations) using out-of-pocket expenditures. Results from two-part count data models of utilization show that social and private insurance matter in the decision of contacting physicians and hospital services but not in the frequency choice. Evidence that could be interpreted as supply-induced demand for physician visits is also found.
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