Subgame Perfect Implementation: A Necessary and Almost Sufficient Condition*
نویسندگان
چکیده
We present a necessary and almost sufftcient condition for subgame perfect implementation of social choice correspondences. In societies with at least three individuals, any social choice correspondence which satisfies no veto power and our necessary Condition a is subgame perfect implementable. Thus Condition GL is analogous to monotonicity which, by Maskin’s celebrated characterization, is necessary and, in a similar way, almost sufficient for Nash implementation. Journal of Economic Literalwe Classification Numbers: 022. 025, 026. ‘c’ 1990 Academx
منابع مشابه
Subgame perfect implementation: A full characterization
Moore and Repullo [Subgame perfect implementation, Econometrica 56 (1988) 1191–1220], and Abreu and Sen [Subgame perfect implementation: a necessary and almost sufficient condition, J. Econ. Theory 50 (1990) 285–299] introduce distinct necessary and sufficient conditions for SPE implementation, when the number of players is at least three. This paper closes the gap between the conditions—a comp...
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