Maximal or Minimal Differentiation in a Hotelling Market? A Fresh Perspective
نویسندگان
چکیده
A perplexing problem in spatial modelling—going back to Hotelling’s linear market—is whether firms will cluster together or separate themselves. Maximal differentiation is the prevailing equilibrium when travel costs are quadratic and minimal differentiation results when price competition is limited. The reality for most markets is that the force that draws firms together (maximize demand) and the force that causes them to separate (avoid price competition) are both present. In many cases, this makes the characterization of an equilibrium difficult. The vast majority of research using the Hotelling model is based on the assumption that all potential consumers buy, yet the reality of many markets is that there are some consumers who seriously consider not buying.When allowing for the possibility that some consumers would consider not buying from either firm, we are able to identify equilibrium locations for firms that first choose locations and then prices in a Hotelling market with linear travel costs. Following the discussion above, we consider ranges of consumers’ willingness to pay for the products relative to the outside good such that the market is not necessarily covered for all location choices. The analysis demonstrates the existence of a pure-strategy location equilibrium, supported by a pure-strategy pricing equilibrium, where firms are moderately differentiated and the market is covered.
منابع مشابه
Welfare losses in models of horizontal And vertical differentiation
We study the percentage of welfare losses (PWL) in models of horizontal and vertical differentiation. In the Hotelling model, we show that PWL depends on the underlying parameters in a non-monotonic way. We also show that PWL can be calculated from market data-locations and market size-except when the market is covered and exhibits maximal product differentiation. PWL can be very large-up to 37...
متن کاملQuality Variations a N D Maximal Variety Differentiation*
We allow quality variations in a duopoly of locationally differentiated products a-la-Hotelling (1929). We analyze the impact of quality variations on the choices of the varieties produced. We show that in a sequential game of variety choice and subsequent quality and price choice there exist only maximal variety differentiation equilibria in pure strategies. Maximal variety differentiation is ...
متن کاملDifferentiation-Induced Switching Costs and Poaching
We show that the presence of sufficiently significant switching costs, which are increasing in the degree of product differentiation, generates an equilibrium configuration with maximal differentiation within the framework of a Hotelling model with linear transportation costs. The equilibrium with maximal differentiation offers a formalization of the idea that competing firms have noncooperativ...
متن کاملSwedish School of Economics and Business Administration the Yrjö Jahnsson Working Paper Series in Industrial Economics
We show that the presence of sufficiently significant switching costs, which are increasing in the degree of product differentiation, generates an equilibrium configuration with maximal differentiation within the framework of a Hotelling model with linear transportation costs. The equilibrium with maximal differentiation offers a formalization of the idea that competing firms have noncooperativ...
متن کاملHow much should my software differ from yours
This paper analyzes an optimal differentiation between two competing application software products when one of the two is produced by a monopolist of a base software. The so called ‘minimum differentiation principle’ by Hotelling (1929) is inappropriate in this market category. One can see the example of our ‘optimal differentiation principle’ in a web browser market, where Microsoft’s Internet...
متن کامل