Approximation and Parameterized Complexity of Minimax Approval Voting
نویسندگان
چکیده
We present three results on the complexity of Minimax Approval Voting. First, we study Minimax Approval Voting parameterized by the Hamming distance d from the solution to the votes. We show Minimax Approval Voting admits no algorithm running in time O(2 log ), unless the Exponential Time Hypothesis (ETH) fails. This means that the O(d) algorithm of Misra et al. [AAMAS 2015] is essentially optimal. Motivated by this, we then show a parameterized approximation scheme, running in time O((3/ǫ) 2d ), which is essentially tight assuming ETH. Finally, we get a new polynomialtime randomized approximation scheme for Minimax Approval Voting, which runs in time n 2 ·log(1/ǫ)) · poly(m), almost matching the running time of the fastest known PTAS for Closest String due to Ma and Sun [SIAM J. Comp. 2009].
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