The Dynamics of Bertrand Price Competition with Cost-Reducing Investments†
نویسندگان
چکیده
We present a dynamic extension of the classic static model of Bertrand price competition that allows competing duopolists to undertake cost-reducing investments in an attempt to “leapfrog” their rival to attain low-cost leadership — at least temporarily. We show that leapfrogging occurs in equilibrium, resolving the Bertrand investment paradox., i.e. leapfrogging explains why firms have an ex ante incentive to undertake cost-reducing investments even though they realize that simultaneous investments to acquire the state of the art production technology would result in Bertrand price competition in the product market that drives their ex post profits to zero. Our analysis provides a new interpretation of “price wars”. Instead of constituting a punishment for a breakdown of tacit collusion, price wars are fully competitive outcomes that occur when one firm leapfrogs its rival to become the new low cost leader. We show that the equilibrium involves investment preemption only when the firms invest in a deterministically alternating fashion and technological progress is deterministic. We prove that when technological progress is deterministic and firms move in an alternating fashion, the game has a unique Markov perfect equilibrium. When technological progress is stochastic or if firms move simultaneously, equilibria are generally not unique. Unlike the static Bertrand model, the equilibria of the dynamic Bertrand model are generally inefficient. Instead of having too little investment in equilibrium, we show that duopoly investments generally exceed the socially optimum level. Yet, we show that when investment decisions are simultaneous there is a “monopoly” equilibrium when one firm makes all the investments, and this equilibrium is efficient. However, efficient non-monopoly equilibria also exist, demonstrating that it is possible for firms to achieve efficient dynamic coordination in their investments while their customers also benefit from technological progress in the form of lower prices.
منابع مشابه
Innovation, Licensing, and Price vs
In this paper, we develop a differentiated duopoly model with endogenous cost-reducing R&D and review the argument on welfare effect of price and quantity competition in the presence of technology licensing. We show that the standard conclusion on duopoly (Singh and Vives, 1984) can be completely reversed. Cournot competition induces lower R&D investment than Bertrand competition does. Moreover...
متن کاملBertrand-nash Equilibrium in the Retail Duopoly Model under Asymmetric Costs
In this paper, the Bertrand's price competition in the retail duopoly with asymmetric costs is analyzed. Retailers sell substitute products in the framework of the classical economic order quantity (EOQ) model with linear demand function. The market potential and competitor price are considered to be the bifurcation parameters of retailers. Levels of the barriers to market penetration depending...
متن کاملMarket Power in Transportation: Spatial Equilibrium under Bertrand Competition
We examine spatial competition along a waterway when shippers are distributed over space. Competition is between barge and rail companies and among barge companies. Equilibrium prices are derived for two variations: oligopolistic rivalry between barge and rail operators, and oligopolistic rivalry among barge operators with terminals located at different points on the waterway. In the first vari...
متن کاملBertrand competition
Bertrand competition is a model of competition used in economics, named after Joseph Louis François Bertrand (1822-1900). Specifically, it is a model of price competition between duopoly firms which results in each charging the price that would be charged under perfect competition, known as marginal cost pricing. The model has the following assumptions: There are at least two firms producing ho...
متن کاملRecursive Lexicographical Search: Finding all Markov Perfect Equilibria of Finite State Directional Dynamic Games†
We define a class of dynamic Markovian games, directional dynamic games (DDG), where directionality is represented by a strategy-independent partial order on the state space. We show that many games are DDGs, yet none of the existing algorithms are guaranteed to find anyMarkov perfect equilibrium (MPE) of these games, much less all of them. We propose a fast and robust generalization of backwar...
متن کامل