Security Proofs for Participation Privacy and Verifiability for Helios

نویسندگان

  • David Bernhard
  • Oksana Kulyk
  • Melanie Volkamer
چکیده

The Helios voting scheme is well studied including formal proofs for verifiability and ballot privacy, but it does not provide participation privacy (i.e. it reveals who participated in the election). Kulyk, Teague and Volkamer proposed an extension to Helios that is claimed to provide ballot privacy as well as participation privacy while providing verifiability against a malicious bulletin board. However, the authors did not prove their claims. Our contribution is to provide a formal definition for participation privacy and to prove that their claims hold.

برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

ثبت نام

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

منابع مشابه

Security Proofs for Participation Privacy, Receipt-Freeness, Ballot Privacy, and Verifiability Against Malicious Bulletin Board for the Helios Voting Scheme

The Helios voting scheme is well studied including formal proofs for verifiability and ballot privacy. However, depending on its version, the scheme provides either participation privacy (hiding who participated in the election) or verifiability against malicious bulletin board (preventing election manipulation by ballot stuffing), but not both at the same time. It also does not provide receipt...

متن کامل

Security Proofs for Participation Privacy and Stronger Veri ability for Helios

The Helios voting scheme is well studied including formal proofs for verifiability and ballot privacy, but it does not provide participation privacy (i.e. it reveals who participated in the election). Kulyk, Teague and Volkamer proposed an extension to Helios that is claimed to provide ballot privacy as well as participation privacy while providing stronger verifiability than Helios. However, t...

متن کامل

A generic construction for voting correctness at minimum cost - Application to Helios

Most voting schemes aim at providing verifiability: voters should be able to check that their ballots did contribute to the outcome (individual verifiability) and that the tallying authorities did their job properly (universal verifiability). Surprisingly, verifiability still does not answer a very simple and natural question: how can I be sure that the published result corresponds to the (sum ...

متن کامل

Ceremonies for End-to-End Verifiable Elections

State-of-the-art e-voting systems rely on voters to perform certain actions to ensure that the election authorities are not manipulating the election result. This so-called “end-to-end (E2E) verifiability” is the hallmark of current e-voting protocols; nevertheless, thorough analysis of current systems is still far from being complete. In this work, we initiate the study of e-voting protocols a...

متن کامل

Ceremonies for End-to-End Verifiable Elections

State-of-the-art e-voting systems rely on voters to perform certain actions to ensure that the election authorities are not manipulating the election result. This so-called “end-to-end (E2E) verifiability” is the hallmark of current e-voting protocols; nevertheless, thorough analysis of current systems is still far from being complete. In this work, we initiate the study of e-voting protocols a...

متن کامل

ذخیره در منابع من


  با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید

برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

ثبت نام

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

عنوان ژورنال:

دوره   شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 2016