Analytic Solutions of Nonlinear Cournot Duopoly Game
نویسندگان
چکیده
The main aim of this study is to construct an explicit form of an analytic solution of a multidimensional difference equation. To this end, we present a nonlinear Cournot duopoly model with unimodal reaction functions, show that its dynamical system is double logistic when the production externalities involved get stronger, and then give a constructive proof of the existence of an analytic solution of the dynamical system. It is well known that there is an existence theorem for nonlinear differential equations, which guarantees the existence of an analytic solution. It is also well known that there is no general existence theorem for a nonlinear difference equation. In consequence, we check whether a discrete-time system to be considered has a solution or not, and then we examine its dynamical characteristic. In spite of this inconvenience, a discrete-time dynamical system is useful for analyzing economic phenomena observed in the real economic world such as business fluctuations that occur in real time. As far as global dynamics are concerned, the usual procedure is to perform numerical simulations to visualize how a dynamical process evolves over time, even if analytical treatment is insufficient. However, it is still possible that numerical simulations do not approximate the true behavior of a discrete-time system, mainly due to computer’s storage limitations; truncations errors and the binary representation of numbers. To examine exact phenomena generated by a discrete-time system, it is therefore natural to attempt to provide its analytical solutions. This study is organized as follows. Section 2 constructs a nonlinear duopoly model with unimodal reaction functions. The first half of Section 3 considers the existence of particular solutions. The second half, the main part of this study, seeks general analytic solutions and demonstrates their explicit forms.
منابع مشابه
Nonlinear dynamics in the Cournot duopoly game with heterogeneous players
We analyze a nonlinear discrete-time Cournot duopoly game, where players have heterogeneous expectations. Two types of players are considered: boundedly rational and naive expectations. In this study we show that the dynamics of the duopoly game with players whose beliefs are heterogeneous, may become complicated. The model gives more complex chaotic and unpredictable trajectories as a conseque...
متن کاملOn the dynamics of a non-linear Duopoly game model
The Cournot duopoly game modeled by Kopel, with adaptive expectations, is generalized by introducing the self-diffusion and cross-diffusion terms. General properties, such as boundedness and uniqueness, are obtained. Non-linear stability results are reached by the analysis of the stability of a ODE system. & 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
متن کاملOn Cournot dynamic multi-team game using incomplete information dynamical system
In this paper, we study an incomplete information dynamical system. Then, we suggest a modification of this system and we applied it to the standard Cournot game. The equilibrium solutions and the conditions of their locally asymptotic stability for the static and the dynamic in monopoly and duopoly cases are studied. Also, we formulate and study the multi-team dynamic Cournot game. (C) 2012 El...
متن کاملNonlinear Dynamics of Cournot Duopoly Game with Social Welfare
This paper explores the idea of cournot duopoly with homogenous expectations in a context of bounded rationality, where two semipublic firms endeavor to maximize the weighted average of social welfare and their own profit. The stability analysis of the fixed points are analyzed and complex dynamic features including period doubling bifurcations of the unique Nash equilibrium is also investigate...
متن کاملEvolutionarily stable conjectures and other regarding preferences in duopoly games
We study the evolutionary selection of conjectures in duopoly games when players have other regarding preferences, i.e. preferences over payoff distributions. In both the Cournot and Bertrand duopoly games, the consistent conjectures are independent of other regarding preferences. Both duopoly games have evolutionarily stable conjectures that depend on other regarding preferences but that do no...
متن کامل