Probabilistic Justification and the Regress Problem
نویسندگان
چکیده
We discuss two objections that foundationalists have raised against infinite chains of probabilistic justification. We demonstrate that neither of the objections can be maintained.
منابع مشابه
Epistemic and Dialectical Regress
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عنوان ژورنال:
- Studia Logica
دوره 89 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2008