Indicative Conditionals, Restricted Quantification, and Naive Truth
نویسنده
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Embedding If and Only If
Compounds of indicative conditionals present some puzzling phenomena. Perhaps most striking, some nested indicative conditionals are uninterpretable. Proponents of NTV hold that indicative conditionals do not have truth values, and they use this to explain why nested indicative conditionals are sometimes uninterpretable: the embedded conditional does not provide the truth conditions needed by t...
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According to the Principle of Conditional Non-Contradiction (CNC), conditionals of the form “If p, q” and “If p, not q” cannot both be true, unless p is inconsistent. This principle is widely regarded as an adequacy constraint on any semantics that attributes truth conditions to conditionals. Gibbard has presented an example of a pair of conditionals that, in the context he describes, appear to...
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A dams's thesis about indicative conditionals is that their assertIlability goes by the conditional subjective probability of the consequent given the antecedent, in very much the same way that assertability normally goes by the subjective probability of truth.' The thesis is well established; the remaining question is how it may best be explained. The nicest explanation would be that the truth...
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Introduction The material interpretation of conditionals is commonly recognized as involving some paradoxical results. I here argue that the truth functional approach to natural language is the reason for the inadequacy of this material interpretation, since the truth or falsity of some pair of statements ‘p’ and ‘q’ cannot per se be decisive for the truth or falsity of a conditional relation ‘...
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A considerable amount of studies have been established on conditional reasoning supporting mental model theory of propositional reasoning. Mental model theory proposed by Johnson- larid and Byrne is an explanation of someone's thought process about how something occurs in the real world. Conditional reasoning as a kind of reasoning is the way to speak about possibilities or probabilities. The a...
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Rew. Symb. Logic
دوره 9 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2016