Nash Equilibrium and Dynamics
نویسندگان
چکیده
Presented at the Opening Panel of the Conference in Honor of John Nash’s 80th Birthday at Princeton University in June 2008. Updated: October 2010. Center for the Study of Rationality, Institute of Mathematics, and Department of Economics, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem. e-mail : [email protected] web page: http://www.ma.huji.ac.il/hart I have seen “nash equilibrium” in print, as if “nash” were an English word. Having one’s name spelled with a lower-case initial letter is surely a sign of lasting fame!
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