The Moscow Nuclear Summit and the Status of Russia’s Smuggling Threat

80 The nuclear summit held in Moscow from April 19 to 20—among the heads of the eight leading Western states (including Russia)—has now come and gone. Prior to the meeting, there had been at least modest hopes within the nonproliferation community that long-neglected issues of Russian nuclear security might finally be discussed at the highest levels, more effective solutions proposed, and information about them spread by the international news media gathered there. On the eve of the summit, indeed, then-Russian National Security Advisor Yuri Baturin stated publicly that the problem of nuclear diversion was Russia’s toppriority security concern. But rather than fulfilling its great potential, the summit turned largely into a self-congratulatory gathering for leaders facing re-election. In fact, an uncritical atmosphere in regard to Russia and its inability to control the security of its nuclear materials—to say nothing of its warheads—reigned at the Moscow summit. All told, nuclear security issues were discussed for less than two hours on April 20. This report analyzes the results of the nuclear summit in the context of the enduring Russian smuggling threat. It discusses what modest accomplishments were achieved, what problems remain, and how the G-7 states and Russia plan to go about solving them more effectively. RESULTS OF THE SUMMIT