Auctioning Resource Rights

نویسندگان

  • Ken Hendricks
  • Robert H. Porter
  • Kenneth Hendricks
چکیده

We review the issues involved in designing a mechanism for allocating resource rights. We focus on the case of exploration and development rights for oil and gas leases in U.S. federal lands to highlight the tradeoffs at play. The main issues concern the design of the lease contract, the design of the auction, and the supply of leases. A distinguishing feature of oil and gas leases is that the mechanism must not only solve the adverse selection problem of selecting the bidder with the highest valuation but also the moral hazard problem of ensuring that right holders make efficient investment decisions.

برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

ثبت نام

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

منابع مشابه

Resource and Requirement Schemas Applied to Auctioning in a Com

any class that implements OCEANDocNode is required to implement this method. While OCEANDocNode defines the framework for building the content of a schema construct, the implementing classes must also provide an interface to the data model of their particular construct. This means that for any schema construct, the corresponding API class must provide access to its data model via class methods ...

متن کامل

Supporting Co-Allocation in an Auctioning-Based Resource Allocator for Grid Systems

In this paper, we present the overall design for an auctioning based resource trading/acquiring system that can be deployed in wide-area computing systems such as Grid systems. Selecting the winning bids is one of the core issues in any system that utilizes the auctioning paradigm. We identify the unique aspects of our system that impact the winner selection process. More specifically, the nece...

متن کامل

Using contests to allocate pollution rights

In this paper we advocate a new initial allocation mechanism for a tradable pollution permit market. We outline a Permit Allocation Contest (PAC) that distributes permits to firms based on their rank relative to other firms. This ranking is achieved by ordering firms based on an observable ‘external action’ where the external action is an activity or characteristic of the firm that is independe...

متن کامل

Fairness in Combinatorial Auctioning Systems

One of the Multi-Agent Systems that is widely used by various government agencies, buyers and sellers in a market economy, in such a manner so as to attain optimized resource allocation, is the Combinatorial Auctioning System (CAS). We study another important aspect of resource allocations in CAS, namely fairness. We present two important notions of fairness in CAS, extended fairness and basic ...

متن کامل

Does Auctioning

We use experiments to examine whether the auctioning of entry rights affects the behavior of market entrants. Standard economic arguments suggest that the license fee paid at the auction will not affect prices since it constitutes a sunk cost. This argument is not uncontested though and this paper puts it to an experimental test. Our results indicate that an auction of entry licenses may affect...

متن کامل

ذخیره در منابع من


  با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید

برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

ثبت نام

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

عنوان ژورنال:

دوره   شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 2013