Optimal Exclusion The Value of An Additional Bidder ∗
نویسندگان
چکیده
This paper introduces granting of “exclusive bidding rights” to a subset buyers as a way of fostering their pre-auction information acquisition. A revenue maximizing monopolist gives N ef , the socially efficient number of informed buyers, or N ef + 1 buyers the exclusive right to bid, depending on a lumpsum value discovery (VD) cost. In the former case, equilibrium VD is efficient but allocation is ex-post inefficient while in the latter case it is the opposite (and participation in the auction is stochastic). Interestingly, the optimal reserve depends discontinuously and non-monotonically on the VD cost but is notably independent of endogenous information concerning VD.
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