Ownership Form, Managerial Incentives, and the Intensity of Rivalry
نویسندگان
چکیده
This study investigates how differences in ownership form—between franchised and company-owned units—affect managerial incentives and competitive pricing in different oligopolistic contexts. We argue that chains may restrict decision making in company-owned units as a commitment device to maintain high prices in concentrated markets and found evidence consistent with this argument. We also found that a unit’s ownership form affected its rivals’ competitive behavior. Our results indicate that company-owned units’ ability to raise their own and rivals’ prices in highly concentrated markets led to their higher performance relative to franchised units.
منابع مشابه
Ownership Structure , Managerial Incentives , and the Intensity of Rivalry
This study investigates how ownership forms affect managerial incentives and pricing in different competitive contexts. We explore how the difference in ownership form between franchised and company-owned units influences the incentives of the managers who take the day-to-day decisions that constitute interfirm rivalry. We argue that chains with company-owned units may restrict decision-making ...
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