Strategy-Proof Voting on Compact Ranges
نویسندگان
چکیده
Strategy-proof social choice functions are characterized for societies where the space of alternatives is any full dimensional compact subset of a Euclidean space and all voters have generalized single-peaked preferences. Our results build upon and extend those obtained for cartesian product ranges by Border and Jordan (1983). By admitting a large set of non-Cartesian ranges, we give a partial answer to the major open question left unresolved in this pioneering article. We prove that our class is composed by generalized median voter schemes which satisfy an additional condition, called the intersection property [Barberà, Massó, and Neme (1997)]. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: D71. © 1998 Academic Press
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