A Kidney Exchange Clearinghouse in New England.

A Proposed Mechanism for the Iranian Model of Kidney Donation (A Comparison of the Iranian and Roth’s Models)

Optimal resource allocation by means of the price mechanism is one of the main duties of the economics. Optimum allocation is sometimes realized not through the price mechanism, but via assignment algorithms due to an insufficient number of agents on either side of the exchange. Facing the same problem, the kidney market may be considered as a type of market failure that calls for market design...

New Challenges in Multihospital Kidney Exchange.

The growth of kidney exchange presents new challenges for the design of kidney exchange clearinghouses. The players now include directors of transplant centers, who see sets of patientdonor pairs, and can choose to reveal only difficult to match pairs to the clearinghouse, while withholding easy to match pairs to transplant locally. This reduces the number of transplants. We discuss how the inc...

The Effect of the Introduction of a Clearinghouse on Trading Costs: The New York Stock Exchange in the 1890s

Consumers or Citizens? Whose Voice Will Healthwatch Represent and Will It Matter?; Comment on “Challenges Facing Healthwatch, a New Consumer Champion in England”

Efforts to achieve effective and meaningful patient and public involvement (PPI) in healthcare have existed for nearly a century, albeit with limited success. This brief commentary discusses a recent paper by Carter and Martin exploring the “Challenges Facing Healthwatch, a New Consumer Champion in England,” and places these challenges in the context of the broader struggle to give a voice to h...

Strategy-Proof and Efficient Kidney Exchange Using a Credit Mechanism

We present a credit-based matching mechanism for dynamic barter markets—and kidney exchange in particular—that is both strategy proof and efficient, that is, it guarantees truthful disclosure of donor-patient pairs from the transplant centers and results in the maximum global matching. Furthermore, the mechanism is individually rational in the sense that, in the long run, it guarantees each tra...