The Hobbesian Trap ∗ Sandeep Baliga Northwestern University Tomas Sjöström
نویسندگان
چکیده
“So that in the nature of man, we find three principal causes of quarrel. First, competition; secondly, diffi dence; thirdly, glory. The first maketh men invade for gain; the second, for safety; and the third, for reputation. The first use violence, to make themselves masters of other men’s persons, wives, children, and cattle; the second, to defend them; the third, for trifles...”(Hobbes [14], p. 64).
منابع مشابه
The Hobbesian Trap
“So that in the nature of man, we find three principal causes of quarrel. First, competition; secondly, diffi dence; thirdly, glory. The first maketh men invade for gain; the second, for safety; and the third, for reputation. The first use violence, to make themselves masters of other men’s persons, wives, children, and cattle; the second, to defend them; the third, for trifles...”(Hobbes [15],...
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