Strict Nash equilibria in large games with strict single crossing in types and actions
نویسندگان
چکیده
In this paper we study games where the space of player types is atomless and payoff functions satisfy the property of strict single crossing in types and actions. Under mild technical assumptions on separation and countability in the space of actions and on comparability in the space of types, we prove that every Nash equilibrium is essentially strict. We briefly develop and discuss the relevant consequences, giving existence results of strict Nash equilibrium and evolutionarily stable strategy in incomplete information
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