An Axiomatization of the Prekernel of Nontransferable Utility Games*
نویسندگان
چکیده
We characterize the prekernel of NTU games by means of consistency, converse consistency, and five axioms of the Nash type on bilateral problems. The intersection of the prekernel and the core is also characterized with the same axioms over the class of games where the core is nonempty.
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تاریخ انتشار 1996