Expounding the First Incompleteness Theorem

نویسنده

  • PETER SMITH
چکیده

Part 1. From Gödel 1931 to Kleene 1943 2 1. Notation and terminology 2 2. Gödel 1931: in the beginning 3 3. Tarksi 1933: truth (but not proof) 7 4. Gödel 1934: the Princeton lectures 8 5. Carnap 1934: does he prove the diagonal lemma? 11 6. Kleene 1936: general recursive functions and a new proof 12 7. Rosser 1936: strengthening the first theorem 13 8. Turing 1936, 1938: incompleteness assumed 15 9. Rosser 1939: the story so far 15 10. Hilbert and Bernays 1939: the First Theorem revisited 17 11. Kleene 1943: proving the First Theorem again 17

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تاریخ انتشار 2012