Bayesian Games
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چکیده
A Bayesian, or incomplete information, game is a generalization of a complete-information game. Recall that in a complete-information game, the game is assumed to be common knowledge. In a Bayesian game, in addition to what is common knowledge, players may have private information. This private information is captured by the notion of an epistemic type, which describes a player’s knowledge. The Bayesian-game formalism makes two simplifying assumptions:
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