Symmetric Incomplete Information Games as Stochastic Games
نویسنده
چکیده
The purpose of this chapter is to show how games with incomplete information in fact reduce to stochastic games, as long as the information is symmetric among the players. The new state space corresponds to the beliefs on the space of unknown parameters.
منابع مشابه
A review on symmetric games: theory, comparison and applications
Game theory models decision makers' behaviors in strategic situations. Since the structures of games are different, behavior and preferences of the players are different in various types of game. This paper reviews various situations of games. Here, characteristics of some common games are discussed and compared. Specifically, we focus on a group of games called symmetric games including Prison...
متن کاملIncomplete Information Games with Transcendental Values
In a repeated zero-sum two-person game with incomplete information on both sides, the asymptotic value is defined as v = lim_oo v", where vn is the value of the game with n repetitions. It is shown here that v may be a transcendental number even for games in which all parameters defining the game are rational. This is in contrast to the situation in stochastic games where by the result of Bewle...
متن کاملA Probabilistic Representation for the Value of Zero-Sum Differential Games with Incomplete Information on Both Sides
We prove that for a class of zero-sum differential games with incomplete information on both sides, the value admits a probabilistic representation as the value of a zero-sum stochastic differential game with complete information, where both players control a continuous martingale. A similar representation as a control problem over discontinuous martingales was known for games with incomplete i...
متن کاملNo-Regret Learning in Bayesian Games
Recent price-of-anarchy analyses of games of complete information suggest that coarse correlated equilibria, which characterize outcomes resulting from no-regret learning dynamics, have near-optimal welfare. This work provides two main technical results that lift this conclusion to games of incomplete information, a.k.a., Bayesian games. First, near-optimal welfare in Bayesian games follows dir...
متن کاملNo-Regret Learning in Repeated Bayesian Games
Recent price-of-anarchy analyses of games of complete information suggest that coarse correlated equilibria, which characterize outcomes resulting from no-regret learning dynamics, have near-optimal welfare. This work provides two main technical results that lift this conclusion to games of incomplete information, a.k.a., Bayesian games. First, near-optimal welfare in Bayesian games follows dir...
متن کامل