On the Equivalence of Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Implementation for Environments with Non-Linear Utilities∗
نویسندگان
چکیده
We extend the equivalence between Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation established by Gershkov et al. (Econometrica, 2013) to environments with non-linear utilities satisfying the property of increasing differences over distributions and the convex-valued assumption. The new equivalence result produces novel implications to the literature on the principal-agent problem with allocative externalities, environmental mechanism design, and public good provision.
منابع مشابه
On the Equivalence of Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Implementation∗
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