Selfish Routing with Common-knowledge
نویسنده
چکیده
Garing et al [3] is the first paper in which Bayesian Nash equilibrium is treated. They analysis Bayesian extension of routing game specified by the type-space model of Harsanyi [4] as information structure, and they collected several results: (1) the existence and computability of pure Nash equilibrium, (2) the property of the set of fully mixes Bayesian Nash equilibria and (3) the upper bound of the price of anarchy for specific types of social function associated with Bayesian Nash equilibria.
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