Intrinsic value: a reply to Justus et al.

In a recent Forum article in TREE, Justus and co-authors distinguish intrinsic from instrumental value in terms of its relation to human beings [1]. They define ‘intrinsic value’ to mean ‘a value independent of humans’ or that ‘is valuer independent and thus independent of stakeholder valuation.’ In contrast, instrumental value derives ‘from valuers such as humans.’ According to this definition, ‘instrumental value is simply value that depends on valuers.’ Justus and colleagues argue that if intrinsic value has no basis in what stakeholders consider important, it follows that ‘intrinsic value cannot have a role in conservation decision making’ [1]. A view popular in the 1970s ascribed rights to natural objects and in that way divorced intrinsic value from human valuation [2]. As a legal theory the idea that natural objects have intrinsic value in the sense of ‘standing’ or ‘rights’ independent of human valuers went nowhere – as Justus et al. correctly conclude it must. While their logic is impeccable, Justus et al. fail to show that conservationists generally believe that intrinsic value is ‘valuer independent.’ On the contrary, conservationists argue that people may value natural objects because of their inherent qualities rather than because of any benefit those objects offer them. In other words, conservationists distinguish (1) those attributes of nature we value as objects of our love, reverence, appreciation and respect from (2) those attributes of nature we value for the contribution they make to our wellbeing. Conservationists criticize the assumption associated with economics that human welfare, utility or benefit is the only thing that has value ‘in itself’ and that the value of any other goodmust be measured instrumentally as a means to produce it. Thus Holmes Rolston has argued that natural beauty has ‘an intrinsic objective value, valued by me but for what it is in itself’ [4]. Justus et al. do not cite to or quote from a conservationist so confused as to think that intrinsic value is ‘valuer independent.’ Justus et al. mistakenly believe that aesthetic value is instrumental. They state, ‘Art is instrumentally, not intrinsically, valuable because [of]. .. the responses it produces in humans (e.g. pleasure)’ [1]. Pornography then