Economics 703 Advanced Microeconomics Prof. Peter Cramton Lecture Note 3: Mechanism Design Outline A. Introduction to Games with Incomplete Information C. Multilateral Trading Mechanisms 1. Dissolving a Partnership 2. Optimal Auctions A. Introduction to Games with Incomplete Information

نویسنده

  • Peter Cramton
چکیده

A. Introduction to Games with Incomplete Information 1. Imperfect Information vs. Incomplete Information 2. Bayesian Games 3. The Revelation Principle B. Bilateral Trading Mechanisms 1. War of Attrition 2. Simultaneous Offers 3. The Public Choice Problem 4. A General Model 5. Efficiency in Games with Incomplete Information 6. Durability C. Multilateral Trading Mechanisms 1. Dissolving a Partnership 2. Optimal Auctions

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تاریخ انتشار 1998