Weak independence and veto power
نویسندگان
چکیده
Weak independence (WI) prevents x from socially ranking above y at profile p if y ranks above x at profile p9 and each individual ordering of hx,yj is the same at p as at p9. If f is transitive-valued and satisfies WI and Pareto then someone has veto power. 2000 Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved.
منابع مشابه
Iris Image Quality Metrics with Veto Power and Nonlinear Importance Tailoring
Linear combinations of metrics for assessing biometric sample quality are weak, because they lack veto power. For example, a good score for sharp focus of an ocular image would ‘compensate’ in an additive combination for the fact that the eyelids are fully closed; or fully open eyelids would compensate for the image being many diopters out-of-focus. Normalised multiplicative quality factors are...
متن کاملThe Concept of Sub-independence and Its Application in Statistics and Probabilities
Many Limit Theorems, Convergence Theorems and Characterization Theorems in Probability and Statistics, in particular those related to normal distribution , are based on the assumption of independence of two or more random variables. However, the full power of independence is not used in the proofs of these Theorems, since it is the distribution of summation of the random variables whic...
متن کاملBudget institutions and political insulation: why states adopt the item veto
Forty-three of the fifty states of the United States have granted item veto authority to their governors as part of state constitutions. In this paper, I test explanations of why and when a legislature would cede institutional power. Using data from 1865 to 1994, I show that these measures are most likely proposed by fiscal conservatives who fear the loss of power in the future; in order to pro...
متن کاملImplementing Social Choice Correspondences using k-Strong Nash Equilibrium zizxag dxiga zen`zd yenin
In this work we generalize the theorems of Maskin[Mas99] and of Benoı̂t and Ok[BO06]. We weaken the no veto power condition of Maskin and limited veto power of Benoı̂t and Ok to no veto power of degree m and a generalization of it, limited veto power of degree m. We define the notion of implementability of a social choice correspondence using k-strong Nash equilibrium. We prove that any monotone ...
متن کاملRatification and Veto Constraints in Mechanism
This note points out some restrictions imposed by the notion of ratification. This notion is widely used in the mechanism design literature that assumes that each agent has a veto power. We exhibit allocations that are not ratifiable and nevertheless can be implemented through a mechanism that gives veto power to the agents.
متن کامل