Representationalism and indeterminate perceptual content

JOHN DILWORTH Department of Philosophy, Western Michigan University, Kalamazoo, Michigan 49008, USA. (E-mail: [email protected]) [Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (2007), pp. 369-387. The original publication is available at www.springerlink.com] Abstract. Representationalists currently cannot explain counter-examples that involve indeterminate perceptual content, but a double content (DC) view is more promising. Four related cases of perceptual imprecision are used to outline the DC view, which also applies to imprecise photographic content. Next, inadequacies in the more standard single content (SC) view are demonstrated. The results are then generalized so as to apply to the content of any kinds of non-conventional representation. The paper continues with evidence that a DC account provides a moderate rather than extreme realist account of perception, and it concludes with an initial analysis of the failure of nomic covariance accounts of information in indeterminacy cases.