How economic rewards affect cooperation reconsidered

نویسندگان

  • John H. Kagel
  • Dan R. Schley
چکیده

Recent studies suggest that payoffs in cents, compared to dollars, produce less defection in a repeated prisoner’s dilemma game. We are unable to replicate these findings with conventional economic procedures or in a direct replication. © 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

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تاریخ انتشار 2013