Two Player Non Zero-sum Stopping Games in Discrete Time
نویسندگان
چکیده
We prove that every two player non zero-sum stopping game in discrete time admits an -equilibrium in randomized strategies, for every > 0. We use a stochastic variation of Ramsey Theorem, which enables us to reduce the problem to that of studying properties of -equilibria in a simple class of stochastic games with finite state space.
منابع مشابه
A TRANSITION FROM TWO-PERSON ZERO-SUM GAMES TO COOPERATIVE GAMES WITH FUZZY PAYOFFS
In this paper, we deal with games with fuzzy payoffs. We proved that players who are playing a zero-sum game with fuzzy payoffs against Nature are able to increase their joint payoff, and hence their individual payoffs by cooperating. It is shown that, a cooperative game with the fuzzy characteristic function can be constructed via the optimal game values of the zero-sum games with fuzzy payoff...
متن کاملStopping Games in Continuous Time
We study two-player zero-sum stopping games in continuous time and infinite horizon. We prove that the value in randomized stopping times exists as soon as the payoff processes are right-continuous. In particular, as opposed to existing literature, we do not assume any conditions on the relations between the payoff processes. We also show that both players have simple ε-optimal randomized stopp...
متن کاملTwo-player Nonzero–sum Stopping Games in Discrete Time by Eran Shmaya
We prove that every two-player nonzero–sum stopping game in discrete time admits an ε-equilibrium in randomized strategies for every ε > 0. We use a stochastic variation of Ramsey's theorem, which enables us to reduce the problem to that of studying properties of ε-equilibria in a simple class of stochastic games with finite state space. 1. Introduction. The following optimization problem was p...
متن کاملStopping games: recent results
We survey recent results on the existence of the value in zerosum stopping games with discrete and continuous time, and on the existence of ε-equilibria in non zero-sum games with discrete time. ∗Department of Managerial Economics and Decision Sciences, Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Northwestern University, and the School of Mathematical Sciences, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv 69978, I...
متن کاملSufficient Condition on the Existence of Saddle Points on Markov Games
We study the sufficient conditions for the existence of a saddle point of timedependent discrete Markov zero-sum game up to a given stopping time. The stopping time is allowed to take either a finite or an infinite non-negative random variable with its associated objective function being well-defined. The result enables us to show the existence of the saddle points of discrete games constructed...
متن کامل