Argumentation In Representation Semantics

It seems rather natural to admit that language use is governed by rules that relate signs, forms and meanings to possible intentions or possible interpretations, in function of utterance situations. Not less natural should seem the idea that the meaning of a natural language expression conveys enough material to the input of these rules, so that, given the situation of utterance, they determine the appropriate interpretation. If this is correct, the semantic description of a natural language expression should output not only the 'informative content' of that expression, but also all sorts of indications concerning the way this expression may be used or interpreted. In particular, the argumentative power of utterances is due to argumentative indications conveyed by the sentences uttered, indications that are not part of their informative content . This paper emphasizes the role of argumentation in language and shows bow it could be accounted for in a formal Representation Semantics framework. An "example of an analysis is provided in order to show the "system at work". I. ARGUMENTATION AND THE SEMANTIC PROGRAM. A. What is linguistic in argumentation. The theory of argumentation developped by Jean-Claude Anscombre and Oswald Ducrot is an attempt to describe some aspects of language that have not been carefully studied yet, in spite of their importance for linguistic theory, discourse representation, as well as simulation of understanding. In their framework, utterances are seen to be produ@ed in order to argue for some particular conclusions with a certain force, depending on the situation of utterance. Thus, when I utter (I) This is beautiful but expensive in front of a shop window and pointing to some item, I present my utterance as a reason for not buying this item, ~hile if I say (2) This is expensive but beautiful *This work has been supported in part by a contract with the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (contrat~n ° 95. 5122) I am giving a reason to buy the item I. Note that after uttering(l), I can perfectly walk into the store and buy the item : what is odd, in normal situations is to say (I') (l') This is beautiful but expensive, and therefore, I will buy it. Anscombre and Ducrot unburied the old Aristotelician concept of topoi to describe the movement from the utterance to the conclusion. They take these topoi to be of the form : (To) The more X is P, the more Y is Q. where 'X is P' is the idea expressed by the original utterance, and 'Y is Q' is the argumentative orientation (the conclusion argued for by producing the original utterance in the particular situation in which it is uttered). In Raccah 84, I have argued for the adequacy of a slightly different form for the topoi, which takes into account the epistemical relation of the speaker to the p~miss : (T) The more evidence I have in favor of X being P The more arguments l'have in favor of Y being Q. Topoi of this kind are shown to avoid problems with non-gradual properties and, I argue, are closer to the intuition we have about the argumentative process 2. The description of argumentative connectives provides rules to select the argumentative orientation of a compounded utterance in function of the more basic utterances that they connect. Thus, the analysis of (1), (i'), and (2) suggests the following description of the argumentative aspects of but : in any utterance of P but Q, the presence of but Ii am talking here of normal situations , where expensiveness is a reason not to buy, while beauty is a reason to buy 2The idea is that it is not the degree of P-uess of X (when this means something) that makes Y (more or less) Q, but the degree to which the speaker believes X is P that entitles him (her) to believe (more or less) that Y is Q.