Cryptanalysis against Symmetric-Key Schemes with Online Classical Queries and Offline Quantum Computations

In this paper, quantum attacks against symmetric-key schemes are presented in which adversaries only make classical queries but use quantum computers for offline computations. Our attacks are not as efficient as polynomial-time attacks making quantum superposition queries, while our attacks use the realistic model and overwhelmingly improve the classical attacks. Our attacks convert a type of classical meet-inthe-middle attacks into quantum ones. The attack cost depends on the number of available qubits and the way to realize the quantum hardware. The tradeoffs between data complexity D and time complexity T against the problem of cardinality N are D · T 2 = N and D · T 6 = N in the best and worst case scenarios to the adversary respectively, while the classic attack requires D · T = N . This improvement is meaningful from an engineering aspect because several existing schemes claim beyond-birthday-bound security for T by limiting the maximum D to be below 2 according to the classical tradeoff D · T = N . Those schemes are broken when quantum computations are available to the adversaries. The attack can be applied to many schemes such as a tweakable blockcipher construction TDR, a dedicated MAC scheme Chaskey, an on-line authenticated encryption scheme McOE-X, a hash function based MAC H-MAC and a permutation based MAC keyed-sponge. The idea is then applied to the FX-construction to discover new tradeoffs in the classical query model. keywords: post-quantum cryptography, classical query model, meet-inthe-middle, tradeoff, Chaskey, TDR, keyed sponge, KMAC, FX