Workers, Warriors, and Criminals: Social Conflict in General Equilibrium by Ernesto Dal Bó and Pedro Dal Bó -- Reforms: IMF Sixth Jacques Polak Annual Research Conference, November 3-4, 2005
نویسندگان
چکیده
We analyze how economic shocks and policies affect the intensity of social conflict. We view conflict phenomena such as crime and civil war as involving resource appropriation activities. We show that not all shocks that could make society richer reduce conflict. Positive shocks to labor intensive industries diminish social conflict, while positive shocks to capital intensive industries increase it. The key requirement is that appropriation activities be more labor intensive than the economy. Our theory can explain the positive association between crime and inequality, and the curse of natural resources; it also offers guidance on how to integrate international trade policy with peace-keeping efforts. Including appropriation activities into a canonic general equilibrium model introduces a social constraint to policy analysis. This helps explain why reforms that appear efficiency-enhancing may be delayed and become unpopular when implemented, and why societies may sympathise with populist policies, apparently inefficient redistribution and “national development strategies.” JEL Classification: D72, D74, D78, F13, H23, K42, O1.
منابع مشابه
Workers, Warriors, and Criminals: Social Conict in General Equilibrium
We analyze how economic shocks and policies a¤ect the intensity of social conict. We show that not all shocks that could make society richer reduce conict. In our model, positive shocks to labor intensive industries diminish social conict, while positive shocks to capital intensive industries increase it. The key requirement is that appropriation activities be more labor intensive than the e...
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