Bayesian persuasion with multiple senders and rich signal spaces
نویسندگان
چکیده
A number of senders with no ex ante private information publicly choose signals whose realizations they observe privately. Senders then convey verifiable messages about their signal realizations to a receiver who takes a non-contractible action that affects the welfare of all players. The space of available signals includes all conditional distributions of signal realizations and allows any sender to choose a signal that is arbitrarily correlated with signals of others. We characterize the information revealed in pure strategy equilibria, and show that greater competition tends to increase the amount of information revealed. JEL classification: D83
منابع مشابه
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عنوان ژورنال:
- Games and Economic Behavior
دوره 104 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2017